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Feature

Energy Conflicts: A Growing
Concern in Latin America
By Patricia I. Vásquez

Protesters burning Christmas decorations in La Paz during a December 30, 2010 Gasolinazo protest against a decree by Bolivian President Evo Morales
to remove fuel subsidies. Photo by James Brunker/Latin Content/Getty Images.

T

he past decade
has witnessed a
proliferation of
energy projects in
Latin America. Many
have been central to the domestic
economic development plans of
governments; others have been
efforts to expand much-delayed
regional energy cooperation or

12

Hemisphere Volume 20

consolidate a particular political
agenda across borders. As oil, gas
and hydroelectricity developments
have multiplied, so have conflicts
brought on by the negative political,
social, environmental and/or
economic externalities these projects
have generated.
While the dynamics of the
conflicts vary, the disputes at

national and local levels share
two underlying triggers: first,
Latin America’s deep-rooted
economic inequality and the
marginalization of certain societal
groups; and second, weak state
management of the revenue from
extractive industries. The region
succeeded in reducing inequality
levels in the last decade through
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improved education and increased
transfers to the poor. The quality
of the education the poor receive,
however, remains lower than that
attained by the top 10% of the
population, and redistribution is
minimal.
Persistent social and economic
differences in spite of increased
natural resource revenues in
producing countries create
frustration among the population
and are at the heart of energyrelated conflicts in Latin America.
These conflicts can be regional,
national or local. Regional
conflicts may be geopolitical; in
other words, related to the use of
energy, particularly oil, as a tool
for building political alliances
across borders, or border conflicts
related to unresolved, long-term
geographical frictions that hinder
energy cooperation between
nations. At the national level,
disputes stem from revenue conflicts
or clashes over the distribution of
natural resource revenues among
different ethnic or economic
groups. Local conflicts, in turn,
emerge from disputes within the
boundaries of areas under oil, gas or
hydroelectricity development.
Revenue and local conflicts
in particular build on historical
economic inequalities, especially
those affecting ethnic minorities,
in addition to weak institutional
frameworks and incomplete
implementation of the rule of
law. If not addressed properly
and in a timely manner, these
disputes may prove a challenge for
economic development models
based on extractive industries and
threaten the stability of democratic
governments.
Geopolitical Conflicts
Countries with large hydrocarbon
reserves sometimes leverage their
abundant resources to exert

political pressure on governments
dependent on energy imports. In
other situations, they may use the
wealth they accumulate through
exports to push broader political
or ideological agendas. Russia,
in its handling of gas supplies to
its European customers, fueled a
geopolitical conflict.
In Latin America, Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez has used
his country’s ample oil and gas
reserves—80.5 billion barrels of
proven oil and 149 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas—to craft energy
cooperation initiatives that have
gained political allies. The specter
of supply interruption hangs over
those who do not share his ideology.
Chávez, a strong critic of the United
States, has also used his country’s
hydrocarbon might to challenge
opposition political views.
Border Conflicts
The most challenging border
conflict in the region is between
Bolivia and Chile and traces its
origin to more than century ago.
Since the War of the Pacific in
the 1880s, when Chile took away
Bolivia’s access to the Pacific
Ocean and left it landlocked,
Bolivians have maintained a
historic claim for return of
the coastline. That grievance
resurfaced in 2002 in the form
of massive popular opposition
in Bolivia to proposals to export
gas from new reserves through a
Chilean port. Violent uprisings
left dozens dead and ousted two
presidents—Gonzalo Sánchez de
Lozada in 2003 and his successor,
Carlos Mesa, in 2005—in what
became known as the “Gas War.”
When the private consortium
project to export Bolivia’s gas fell
through, the companies turned
to Peru instead. Had the original
export venture succeeded, it
would have turned Bolivia, South

America’s poorest country, into
the region’s first exporter of liquid
natural gas (LNG). Instead, that
privilege is enjoyed by Peru, which
became Latin America’s first LNG
exporter in 2010.
Revenue Conflicts
Estimates of Bolivia’s proven
natural gas reserves increased from
roughly 4.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf )
in 2000 to 27 tcf in 2009. Bolivia
has since been immersed in a
long period of political instability
as opposing groups struggle to
control gas resources. This struggle
has highlighted Bolivia’s persistent
class and ethnic differences: The
relatively small percentage of the
population of Spanish descent,
which controls the gas-rich
southeastern provinces of Tarija,
Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, has
squared off against the majority
indigenous population in the
country’s western highlands.
Underlying these differences are
historical economic inequalities, as
revenues from the eastern energyproducing departments have
usually failed to improve the living
standards of the poor in the rest of
the country.
In March 1990, a nationwide
march organized by the indigenous
population —Marcha por el
Territorio y la Dignidad (March
for Territory and Dignity)—
precipitated a series of laws
that increased recognition of
indigenous peoples’ rights and
their participation in the country’s
political life. Most important
among them was the Law of
Popular Participation, which
aimed to decentralize state power
by transferring political and
administrative control – and 20%
of the national budget – to local
municipalities.
The ascendancy of indigenous
President Evo Morales in 2006,
Hemisphere Volume 20
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which marked the first time Bolivia’s
majority indigenous population has
held political power, can be traced
to the push for inclusion that gained
momentum throughout the 1990s.
Morales also sought economic
power through greater control of the
profitable gas revenues in Bolivia’s
southeastern states. Rather than
acting as a balancing force, however,
his election deepened the divide
between the rich eastern lowlands
and the poor western highlands.
Morales set out to mandate a
redistribution of some 30% of gas
revenues to pay for social programs
for retirees, public school students
and other groups in the western
states. The move weakened the
autonomy movement, but many
governance inefficiencies continue
to create popular discontent.
Clientelism, rent-seeking practices
and corruption persist, particularly
within the state-owned oil company
(Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales de
Bolivia, or YPFB). Most important,
thriving gas revenues, which went
from $620 million in 2004 to $3.2
billion in 2008 (more as a function
of price than increased investments),
have failed to improve the livelihood
of most poor Bolivians.
Morales is trying to reach a
balance between the gas industry
and growing discontent among
indigenous groups who have yet
to enjoy the benefits of oil and
gas projects in their territories.
Pushing forward with hydrocarbon
development could erode Morales’s
indigenous support, open the way
to increased confrontation from his
own constituency and lead to the
development of local conflicts.
Local Conflicts
With conventional oil reserves
becoming harder to tap around
the world, a new and largely
undeveloped hydrocarbons
frontier in the heart of the
14
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Amazon has attracted the interest
of governments and oil and gas
producers. Similarly, attempts by
Latin American governments to
promote regional energy integration
and cooperation have resulted in
several new hydroelectric projects,
again mostly in the Amazon, as part
of the South American Regional
Infrastructure Integration Initiative
(IIRSA). The growing emergence of
oil, gas and hydroelectric projects

Protesters demonstrated against the construction
of the Belo Monte Dam in Brazil in front of
the Brazilian Permanent Mission to the United
Nations on April 28, 2010 in New York City.
Photo by Ben Hider/Getty Images.

in areas inhabited by indigenous
communities that are now more
effectively voicing their grievances
has spawned a proliferation of local
conflicts.
Energy-related local conflicts
are arguably the most difficult
to solve because of the variety of
actors involved, the complexity
of the issues that need resolution
and the intricacy of the applicable
legal framework. The potential for
such conflicts to spread depends on
several triggers:

1. The environmental and social
standards of the company
involved in the energy
projects. In the past decade,
Latin America has seen a
proliferation of small oil
and gas companies as well as
large national oil companies
(NOCs), some of which
observe less stringent social
and environmental safeguards
than the big majors.
2. The local community’s
level of radicalization and
opposition to the energy project.
Indigenous movements have
radicalized their actions and
gained more sophisticated
negotiating skills across
Latin America in the past
two decades. The extent of
opposition and radicalization
may depend on various
factors, among them local
culture, the historical
relationship between the
community and extractive
industries, and NGO
involvement.
3. The availability of institutional
mechanisms to mediate
conflicts. Latin American
countries often lack wellfunctioning institutions with
the capacity to effectively
mediate conflicts. An
exception to this rule is the
Peruvian Ombudsman’s
Office, which holds a high
degree of legitimacy among
all stakeholders and has
succeeded in de-escalating
conflicts. Local NGOs
usually have lower success
rates in mediating energyrelated conflicts.
4. The extent of law enforcement.
A constant source of energy
conflicts is laws that are
overlooked or improperly
applied, or an abundance
of overlapping rules that
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make them confusing and
inoperative. Combined
with government failure to
comply with international
legal standards, such as
those imposed by the
ILO 169 Convention and
the UN Declaration of
the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, ineffective law
enforcement could lead
populations affected by
energy development to resort
to violence to seek answers to
their problems.
5. The existence of old grievances
or a history of negative
externalities related to
energy projects. In areas
with a history of social or
environmental damage from
previous energy projects,
local inhabitants tend to
more actively oppose similar
new developments. Such
communities also tend to be
more radicalized. The best
example is the widespread
opposition to new dams in
light of the deep scars left by
similar projects in the past.
6. The level and nature of
involvement of international
non-governmental
organizations in the conflict.
International NGOs
have grown in power and
sophistication over the last
20 years and are particularly
active in the Amazon. They
play a fundamental role in
supporting communities
in their negotiations with
companies and governments,
but have also been accused of
contributing to the escalation
of some conflicts by imposing
agendas that do not fully
represent the demands of local
communities.
7. The degree to which companies
and governments comply

with previous agreements
with local communities. A
government’s or company’s
failure to comply with a
previous commitment to
a community leaves locals
feeling betrayed and is often a
source of conflict. Trust that is
eroded is difficult to rebuild.
Communities often protest
the breach of contract with
force or violence.
Frequently underlying these
seven elements are the historic
economic disadvantage and social
and political exclusion of the
affected population. In many cases,
indigenous communities find
themselves suddenly negotiating
with large oil corporations for
access to basic education. Quasiisolated and forgotten groups see
these negotiations as their only
chance to draw attention to their
living conditions and improve their
livelihood, or at least gain access to
basic services. When the outcome
of the negotiations is perceived to
be unfair, communities affected by
energy projects may resort to protests
and sometimes violence to express
their dissatisfaction. Conflict in
these circumstances may become
an instrument for forcing some
kind of a solution to old grievances.
Increased coordination over shared
grievances by indigenous groups
at the international, national and
regional levels often exacerbates the
conflicts. Unless properly addressed,
discontent over historical injustices
could build and become a source
of democratic destabilization.
The deadly confrontations in the
Peruvian Amazon city of Bagua in
2009 offered a glimpse of this threat.

the regional level; revenue conflicts
at the national level; and local
conflicts with the potential to reach
national importance unless properly
addressed. Geopolitical and border
conflicts normally receive the most
attention from the general public
and the media. Revenue and local
conflicts, however, carry a greater
risk of destabilizing the region by
building on largely unresolved
inequalities, weak governance and
the increasing radicalization of the
indigenous movement.
Expanded energy projects are
necessary for economic growth
in Latin America, where installed
hydroelectric capacity remains very
low and large oil and gas reserves
await development. At the same
time, the infrastructure required
for such projects constitutes a
tremendous risk factor, as most of
the still-untapped oil and water
sources are in environmentally and
socially sensitive areas.
These social and environmental
fragilities, combined with the dire
economic reality and historical
marginalization of the communities
affected by energy development,
generate gradually more conflictive
situations. Unless addressed rapidly
and properly, these conflicts could
pose important challenges to Latin
America’s political stability and the
region’s prospects for economic
growth. ■
Patricia I. Vásquez is an independent
energy expert and former senior
fellow at the US Institute of Peace,
and an advisor on energy and
sustainable development issues.

Potential Political Repercussions
There are four types of energyrelated conflicts in Latin America:
geopolitical and border conflicts at
Hemisphere Volume 20
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